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THE MODERN UTILITY OF
QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION
Paul D. Carrington *
Professor Carrington examines the proposed amendment to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would confer quasi in rem
jurisdiction on the federal courts and concludes that it should be
rejected. Arguing that the expansion of the concept of personal
jurisdiction has removed most of what justification there once was
for quasi in rem jurisdiction, the author maintains that the lat-
ter jurisdiction often provides only limited and uncertain judg-
ments for local plaintiffs while compelling nonresident defendants
to litigate in an inconvenient forum, and therefore should not be
made available in the federal courts merely to bring their practice
into conformity with that of the courts of the states.
N OW that the venerable concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction
has largely outlived its utility, it is proposed at long last to
make it available in the federal courts. It must be conceded that
the proposal of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to amend
rule 4 1 for this purpose would bring federal courts into line with
the practice in state courts and with long standing Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition. But greater justification than this should be re-
quired before such an antique device is appended to our modern
court apparatus.
It is helpful to understanding to recall that the default judg-
ment was unknown to English law as recently as 250 years ago.
Perhaps because the defendant's presence was essential to trial
by ordeal, the primitive court would not proceed without him.
If he were contumacious, his presence would be compelled. One
of the milder forms of duress employed for this purpose was the
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University. A.B., University of Texas,
1952; LL.B., Harvard, 195S.
'The proposal was first made by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee in
1955. ADvISORY COMrITTEE ON RULES FOR Civim PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AmENDNMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTEICT
COURTS 10, 12-14 (I955). None of the 23 proposals made in this report was
adopted. In i96o, Chief Justice Warren appointed a new committee; in January
of x961, it proposed three amendments which were adopted in April of that
year. 8i Sup. Ct. 22 (ig6I). In October ig6i, the Committee published a draft of 23
proposals, one of them being a repetition of the earlier proposed amendment to
rule 4. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELixINARY DPRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
To RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRICr COURTS 6-9
(i<95).
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writ of attachment, which directed the sheriff to seize and hold
the defendant's goods until he appeared and conducted his de-
fense. The only purpose of this remedy was to compel appear-
ance; if the defendant appeared, his goods were discharged.2
A variation on this practice evolved in the Lord Mayor's Court in
London, where the defendant's property was attached and his
debts garnished without notice to him; the property was turned
over to the plaintiff and the debtors were directed to pay their
debts to the plaintiff on his pledge to make restitution if the
defendant should appear and disprove the debt within a year and
a day.3
The default judgment was recognized in the eighteenth cen-
tury.' The writ of attachment and its companion process of gar-
nishment were then found to have other uses. While there were
many variations in form, a common purpose of the American
legislation dealing with attachment and garnishment was to as-
sure the successful plaintiff satisfaction of his claim. Thus, these
provisional remedies were available only upon the plaintiff's mak-
ing affidavit that the defendant was of a class of persons likely to
frustrate a writ of execution and filing bond to secure the defend-
ant against wrongful attachment.5
These statutes were, however, also bent to the purpose of solv-
ing another problem which had been created with the recognition
of the default judgment -that of remote litigation. A plaintiff
cannot be permitted to compel his defendant to go to a distant
court under threat of a default judgment; if the default is to be
binding, the plaintiff must select a proper court. The principal
restraint on the plaintiff's choice among American courts has been
the requirement of service of process as a basis for personal juris-
diction.6 This requirement was satisfied by personal delivery to
the defendant or his agent or to his place of abode.
2 See generally MirLAR, CvIM PROCEDURE OF THE TRmA COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 74-97 (1952); 3 BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *279.
'This practice was recorded by LOCKE, FoREIGN ATTACHmENT iN TIM LORD
MAYOR'S COURT (1853). It may have Roman ancestry. DRAKE, ATTACH-
MNT z (7th ed. i891).4 Beginning with Act To Prevent Frivolous and Vexatious Arrests, 22 Geo. x,
c. 29 (1725).
aFor a general survey of attachment statutes in many states, see Sturges &
Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, 42 YA E L.J. 487,
503-510 (1933). The custom of London extended only to actions of debt. Early
American law limited provisional remedies to contract actions. DRAKE, op. Cit.
supra note 3, at 10-27. Most of these limitations have been removed however.
' The classic discussions are the opinions in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 724 (I887).
The modern vitality of that decision is exhibited in the doubtful case of Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (I958). As Justice Hunt's dissent in Pennoyer v. Neff
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The difficulties of satisfying this requirement present the plain-
tiff's horn of the dilemma: he should not be frustrated by the
furtive defendant who is skillful at evading the process server.
The statutory remedies of attachment and garnishment offered an
ameliorative, for one class of defendants against whom the statu-
tory writs could be employed were nonresidents. Where the de-
fendant or his domicile cannot be found by the process server,
the plaintiff can direct the sheriff to attach his property or sum-
mon his debtors; if the defendant then fails to appear, his assets
are liquidated to satisfy the resulting default judgment. This is
the familiar pattern of what has come to be known as quasi in
rem jurisdiction.7 So long as the courts insisted on a restrictive
concept of personal jurisdiction and required service of process
as a requisite of a valid default judgment, the quasi in rem juris-
diction served the useful purpose of mitigating the rigors of secur-
ing personal jurisdiction. Many of the cases in which the plain-
tiff was forced to invoke quasi in rem jurisdiction were disputes
that in fairness ought to have been subject to the decision of a
local forum, which decision the defendant could otherwise have
evaded by staying beyond the reach of the process server.
A line of rather questionable decisions has established that at-
tachment and garnishment are not available in the federal courts
until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant has been ob-
tained by service of process." This deprives the federal plaintiff
of the possibility of using the quasi in rem jurisdiction to compel
an appearance by a nonresident defendant and has been a source
of dissatisfaction for some time." And, as Professor Currie has
suggests, some early American courts were satisfied with the citizenship of the
plaintiff as a basis for jurisdiction. E.g., Butterworth v. Kinsey, 14 Tex. 495 (1855).
'The modifier "quasi" is always objectionable. It is used here to distinguish
in rem proceedings in which the title to the property involved is itself the subject
of litigation and in personam proceedings in which attachment and garnishment
may be employed as provisional remedies to conserve assets for later execution. It
does not adequately distinguish actions in which the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
his pre-existing claim to the property against a nonresident defendant. Most
such claims may be brought in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (i958).
Some difficulty is encountered in applying this statute to accommodate enforcement
of liens on interests which are not "property within the district." For a thorough
discussion of this problem, see Annot., 3o A.L.R.2d 208 (1953).
I Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., X39 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1944). For a collection
and criticism of the cases, see Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal
Courts, 59 MICr. L. REv. 337 (g6i). Use of local provisional remedies against a
defendant already before the court is assured by FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
'An early protest was voiced by Judge Lowell in Dormitzer v. Illinois & St.
Louis Bridge Co., 6 Fed. 217, 218 (C.C.D. Mass. i88i). See also Currie, supra note
8; Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem Under Section z655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MICH.
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recently observed, 10 it is perhaps an anomaly that attachment and
garnishment cannot be used in an original action in a federal
court for their historic purpose of compelling appearance, al-
though they are available in state courts for that purpose."
The anomaly, however, is an anomalous exception to an anach-
ronistic rule. In the light of the emerging concept of personal
jurisdiction, the quasi in rem procedure is rarely useful to plain-
tiffs except in cases which the defendant ought not to be asked
to defend in the forum chosen by the plaintiff. The modern devel-
opment has been thoroughly analyzed and explained elsewhere; 12
it is sufficient here to observe that there is no longer any constitu-
tional inhibition on the exercise of jurisdiction in personam over
a defendant whose contacts with the state make it reasonably fair
that he be asked to defend the claim in its courts. The contact
may be sufficient to sustain constructive or substituted service of
process if the defendant has "done business," 13 solicited 1 or
made 15 contracts, operated a motor vehicle,' 6 or committed a
tort 1 in the state, at least in actions arising out of the defendant's
L. REv. 1, 8-9 ('95'); Note, 34 CoP, NELL L.Q. IO3 (1948); Note I3 So. CAL. L.
REv. 361 (1940). A rather queer limitation to the rule was applied in Hearst v.
Hearst, 15 F.R.D. 258 (N.D. Cal. 1954), 68 HARv. L. REV. 367, which held that
a writ of garnishment might be issued by a federal court in anticipation of prospec-
tive service of process, although the writ would not suffice as a basis for further
proceeding and should be quashed when service appeared unlikely. Cf. Jacobson
v. Coon, 165 F.2d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 1948).
20 Currie, supra note 8, at 338.
"' The anomaly is seemingly emphasized by the established federal practice
permitting removal of actions commenced by attachment or garnishment, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1450 (1958), but the inadequacy of quasi in rem procedure is not a reason to
deny the defendant's right to remove in a proper case. This does not explain
Rorick v. Devon Syndicate, 307 U.S. 299 (1939), which held that a federal court
could, after removal of such a case, attach additional property without obtaining
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. That regrettable decision seems to
rest on the mistaken notion that the statute (then REv. STAT. § 646 (1875)) was
inconsistent with former decisions denying the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in
the federal courts.
"' Developments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAv. L. REv. 909
(196o).
"3 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (i935); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583, 589 (1914).
"4 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (i945); Tauza v. Sus-
quehanna Coal Co., 22o N.Y. 259, iiS N.E. 915 (1917).
" Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (i954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). But cf. Erlanger Mils, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4 th Cir. 1956).
"
6 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
" Nelson v. Miller, ii Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (I957) ; Smyth v. Twin State
Improvement Corp., ii6 Vt. 569, 8o A.2d 664 (i95I).
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activities which relate him to the jurisdiction.' All that is con-
stitutionally required is that the legitimate interest of the plain-
tiff in securing relief in the forum of his selection bear a rea-
sonable relation to the burdens imposed on the nonresident de-
fendant who is called upon to defend in a distant forum.19 Thus,
corporate defendants are perhaps more amenable to these "long-
arm" jurisdictional devices than individual defendants whose
personal conveniences are entitled to greater weight." And de-
fendants in highly regulated businesses such as insurance may be
very exposed indeed, for insurance plaintiffs are recognized as
having an especially proper need for local protection.2
While only a few legislatures have as yet fully explored the
possibilities for extending the jurisdiction of their courts, a wide
variety of statutes providing more occasions for the use of con-
structive and substituted service of process 2 and judicial relaxa-
tion extending the availability of older statutes 2 3 have made the
personal jurisdiction problem no longer the obstacle it once was
to the plaintiff who seeks a reasonably accessible forum for his
case. The plaintiff who must resort to quasi in rem proceedings
is seeking to compel an appearance by (or impose a forfeiture on)
a defendant who, so far as appears, has inadequate contact with
the state to make him fairly answerable to the claim there, or who
is not of a class of defendants the legislature has seen fit to subject
to the judgments of its courts. Indeed, the only contact of the
defendant with the community which will be established will be
the fortuitous one that his property or his debtor happens to be
there at the time of commencement of the action. It has been
suggested that quasi in rem jurisdiction is necessary to discourage
debtors from putting their property beyond the reach of a writ of
"The qualification was suggested by Chief Justice Stone in the landmark case
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (I945). Its importance
in some cases may be exemplified in L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus.,
265 F.2d 768 (gth Cir. x959). But cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
19 Developments in the Law -State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 12, at 924.
2 0 Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead -Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv.
285, 292 (1958).
21 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia ex. rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (195o).22 See Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (x959); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. xio, § 17 (1961). It
is perhaps still an open question whether such devices for out-of-state service are
available in a federal court under rule 4(d) (7) or rule 4 (f).
2 3 E.g., Jarrard Motors, Inc. v. Jackson Auto & Supply Co., 237 Miss. 66o, I15




execution.24 Of course, such an avoidance provides only momen-
tary escape since a personal judgment against the debtor can be
enforced by collateral proceedings where his assets are found; this
is especially so in the federal system where statutory provision is
made for the registration of judgments of other district courts.2 5
And, at most, the suggestion argues only for quasi in rem com-
mencement conditioned upon a showing by the plaintiff that such
an exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to avoid unnecessary liti-
gation or absconding. It is not an argument for the foreign at-
tachment where abundant assets are available in a forum in which
the defendant can be subjected to personal jurisdiction.
It is manifestly unsatisfactory to expose the defendant to quasi
in rem litigation which is based on a garnishment summons served
on a nonresident garnishee;2 6 in such cases, there is no showing
that the defendant has any voluntary contact with the forum
state. A fairminded application of the balancing-of-interests test
applied in personal jurisdiction cases would lead to a rejection of
jurisdiction in most cases in which the plaintiff is forced to resort
to such a garnishment. And it is an almost equally harsh doctrine
that exposes the defendant to the hazards of litigation simply be-
cause he has purchased local property or extended credit to a
local debtor, or entrusted goods to a local carrier where the
litigation is unrelated to the property or debt.2 7 Quite acceptable
is the policy of the statute of Pennsylvania, for instance, which
exposes landowners to jurisdiction in personam in actions arising
out of their ownership.28 But it is inconsistent with the modern
requirement of rational forum selection to require the property
owner to answer any and all claims upon pain of forfeiting his
property. Indeed, Professor Ehrenzweig has suggested that it is
unreasonably arbitrary to permit the plaintiff to acquire jurisdic-
tion solely on the basis of service of process.29 Whether or not
this is so, the chance capture of property or debtor is surely a
24 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § io6.i (1935).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958); see 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE ff 69.03(3) (2d ed.
1954).
"
6 E.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (I905). For an example of the sort of
shenanigans invited, see Siro v. American Express Co., 99 Conn. 95, 121 Atl. 280
(1923). But cf. Abel v. Smith, 15I Va. 568, I44 S.E. 616 (1928).
27 Where the claim is related, at least as to the local property and goods, there
is no obstacle to its assertion in federal court. See note 7, supra.
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (I953). The statute was upheld in Dubin v.
City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 6i (Phila. County Ct. 1938).
2
'
9 The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 6$ YALE LJ. 289 (1956).
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slender justification for compelling the defendant to enter the
jurisdiction to defend.30
The most forceful argument for the preservation of such
wooden, irrational procedures as service of process and quasi
in rem jurisdiction is their simplicity. Future rulemakers may
conclude that our present effort to rationalize the choice of
forum has failed: that the time and energy devoted to resolving
disputes about fairness and accessibility are excessive costs for
the benefits derived."' Even this argument is not easy to make
with reference to the most irrational procedure involved in quasi
in rem jurisdiction, for such proceedings have produced a sub-
stantial amount of uneconomic dispute not pertaining to the
merits. An example is the sterile line of cases dealing with the
situs of intangibles, which apparently must be located before they
can be attached.32 And, in any event, if the effort-economy argu-
ment is to prevail and a return to more formalized tests is to be
made, more drastic reforms than the extension of quasi in rem
jurisdiction to the federal courts are in order. Otherwise the
emerging expansion of personal jurisdiction takes on the appear-
ance of class warfare. The same concept of "fair play" invoked
to favor plaintiffs in extending personal jurisdiction must be
available to favor defendants in restricting the quasi in rem
jurisdiction. The present restriction should therefore be pre-
served whether it is anomalous or not. The present rulemakers
should take their stand in favor of fairness and evenhandedness
in preference to doctrinal symmetry.
Unfairness to the defendant, however, is not the only considera-
tion which militates against the proposed amendment to the
rules. The value of the quasi in rem jurisdiction to the federal
plaintiff is likely to be more apparent than real because of the
other limitations on the availability of a federal forum and be-
cause of the persistence of doubts as to the efficacy of the limited
3 This view was shared by Justice Story. Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609,
614 (No. 11134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828). But see Currie, supra note 8, at 345-49.
3 The potential for delay of the devices for challenging the selection of a forum
has only begun to manifest itself. A cursory examination of the cases collected
by West Publishing Co. in its digests will reveal that the process is already
costly. It was this consideration that led the Supreme Court of Washington to
reject the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard
Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959). The decision is criticized by Traut-
man, Forum Non Conveniens in Washington -A Dead Issue? 35 WASH. L. REv.
88 (ig6o).
" See Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants,
49 YA r L.J. 241 (1939).
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judgment, which may make a quasi in rem victory indecisive.
First, it must be observed that the quasi in rem plaintiff will
have to meet the restrictions of the federal venue statutes.3 3 Under
these statutes, most actions cognizable in a federal court may be
brought only in districts in which the defendant is available for
service of process. For example, actions against individuals
which arise under federal law may be brought only in the district
in which all the defendants reside.34 In such cases the defendant
can generally be served at his residence. Actions against corpora-
tions may be brought in districts in which they are incorporated,
qualified to do business, or doing business.36 Such corporations are
subject to service of process under the pertinent qualifications
statutes.37 The irrationality of these federal venue provisions has
been elsewhere remarked; 38 it is enough here to observe that few
cases remain in which resort to quasi in rem procedure is advan-
tageous to the federal plaintiff. Two classes of cases are excep-
tional: actions in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citi-
zenship may be brought in the district in which all defendants or
all plaintiffs reside, 9 and actions against aliens may be brought in
any district.40 A third class of exceptional cases may exist to the
extent that it is possible for a defendant to have a residence in
33 The venue requirements have been held to be inapplicable to lien enforce-
ment proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1958) and its forebears. Gree-
ley v. Lowe, i5 U.S. 58 (1894). The superficial similarity might suggest that this
exception to the venue requirements be extended to include actions brought under
the proposed new rule. But control of the property in dispute is essential to the
relief sought under § r655; hence the venue requirement is clearly inap-
propriate. This is not so with reference to the more personal liabilities sought to be
enforced by the nonresident attachment proceedings brought under the proposed
rule. Furthermore, the language of § I655 deals specially with the problem of
nonresidents and hence suggests an abandonment of residence requirements im-
posed by other statutes. This is to be contrasted with rule 82 which declares that
the rules "shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts or the venue of actions therein."
3428 U.S.C. § 139I(b) (I958).
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (I) authorizes service by leaving a copy of the summons
and complaint at the defendant's "dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion." "Dwelling place" is more inclusive than
residence. Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942) ; Pickford v. Kravetz,
17 Fed. Rules Serv. 4d.I2I, Case i (S.D.N.Y. 1952); cf. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ingerton, 207 F.2d 793 (ioth Cir. 1953).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
" FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d) (3) (7).
38Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts -Suggestions
for Reform, 7 VAxD. L. REv. 6o8 (2954).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958).
4028 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1958).
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the jurisdiction for purposes of the venue statute, but not of the
sort sufficient to justify the use of abode service.4 Only in such
cases might the plaintiff be advantaged by the proposed amend-
ment. 2
Even in such cases, however, the success of the plaintiff in
forcing the defendant into the forum jurisdiction may be fleeting.
Another section of the federal venue statutes provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought 43
If the plaintiff can find no basis for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, the chances are good that the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and the interest of justice will indicate that
some other district would be a more appropriate forum.4 4 It seems
likely that this provision would frustrate some plaintiffs proceed-
ing quasi in rem. It will, however, be a frustration less often
than might be expected because of the recent and regrettable
decision of the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Blaski,45 which held
transfer permissible only to districts in which the plaintiff might
have successfully initiated the action over the protest of the
defendant. This would be a substantial limitation on the use of
section 1404 in a routine diversity case commenced quasi in rem,
inasmuch as the only available transferee district would generally
41 The residence requirement in the venue statute is generally equated to
domicile. King v. Wall & Beaver Street Corp., 145 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1944). It is,
of course, possible to have a domicile in the jurisdiction without having an "abode"
for purposes of rule 4(d)(4). See cases cited in note 35 supra. Many states,
however, exercise jurisdiction over their domiciliaries by constructive service; this
practice was upheld against constitutional challenge in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457 (1940). To the extent that state procedures are available in federal courts
under rule 4(d) (7) or rule 4(f), this third possibility is eliminated.
"' Professor Currie, supra note 8, at 375 suggests that the rules be "rectified in
anticipation of a revision of the venue statutes." Sufficient to the day is the evil
thereof; it seems eminently wise to see what these revisions might be before altering
the rules in aid of unidentified future classes of plaintiffs at the expense of un-
identified future classes of defendants.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
44 Very little effort has been made to articulate standards beyond those stated
in the statute, which is taken to be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Southern Ry. v. Madden, 235 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
953 (I956); Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania A%.R., x83 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. I95O); Ford
Motor Co. v. Ryan, i82 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (i95o);
New York C. & St. L.R.R. v. Vardaman, 181 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. i95o). See gen-
erally I BARRON & HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.3 (Wright
ed. 1958).
45 363 U.S. 335 (i96o).
1962]
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be the district in which all the defendants reside4 6 The idea
expressed in the majority opinion in the Hoffman case was the
grammar-school morality that fairness required equality in the
use of venue statutes and the requirement of service of process.
The Court thus smote the defendant with his own shield, for
these requirements were imposed for his benefit to equalize the
plaintiff's advantage of making the initial choice of forum.
Clearly, the convenience of the plaintiff must be considered in
the administration of section 1404, but the limitations of the
venue statute which the Court invoked are not related to that
consideration and have no purposeful application to the problem.
To the extent that transfer is unavailable, the inconvenienced
defendant may yet seek relief in the discretionary power of the
federal court to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens4 7
Dismissal is a more drastic remedy than transfer, however, and
the defendant who seeks it will have a heavier burden in showing
inconvenience sufficient to justify relief."' Another difficulty is
suggested by the recent holding of the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota that forum non conveniens is not available unless the defend-
ant is available for involuntary service of process in the con-
venient forum. 9 This is a reasonable protection of the plaintiff
only in a court which is unwilling to employ the practice devel-
oped in New York 10 of conditioning the dismissal upon the de-
ll If the action were commenced at the defendant's residence, § 1404 might
afford transfer to the plaintiff's residence, but there is seldom reason to commence
an action quasi in rem at the defendant's residence inasmuch as personal service is
generally available there. See note 41 supra.
" Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Professor Currie was very
critical of this decision. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22
U. CHm. L. REV. 405, 416-38 (i955). Arguably forum non conveniens did not
survive the adoption of § 1404(a). See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342 (196o)
(the doctrine is referred to as "superseded"),. No mention is made of it in the
legislative history, however, and it is still invoked in international cases, where the
statutory remedy of transfer is unavailable, although a strong showing of incon-
venience is necessary to secure a dismissal forcing an American plaintiff to go
abroad. Burt v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 922 (955); Lesser v. Chevalier, 138 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
"
8 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). The court was silent on
the issue of possible deference to state law; it was apparently assured, as it was
in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (947), that federal law should prevail over
any state doctrine on dismissal or transfer for inconvenience. Accord, Willis v.
Weil Pump Co., 222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. i955).4 9 Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. i65, 89 N.W.2d 654
(1958). Accord, Tivoli Realty v. Interstate Circuit, 167 F.2d 155, xg6 (5th Cir.
1948).
5 Wendel v. Hoffman, 259 App. Div. 732, iS N.Y.S.2d 96, appeal dismissed,
[VO. 76:303
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fendant's appearance in the most convenient forum. This is now
a familiar practice in federal admiralty jurisdiction,' 1 and there
is no reason why it should not be extended to ordinary diversity
cases in which the plaintiff has made an unacceptable choice of
forum. The more restrictive use of forum non conveniens would
be in keeping with Hoffman v. Blaski, but no reason is apparent
why that lamentable decision should be extended to limit the dis-
cretionary as well as the statutory remedy. 52
The foregoing limitations on the availability of a federal forum
exclude most of the cases in which a plaintiff might be advantaged
by the availability of quasi in rem jurisdiction. It must be con-
ceded that among the cases excluded are most of the worst. But
the restrictions on transfer and dismissal leave a small residue of
cases in which a nonresident or alien defendant would be unable
to escape from litigation in a forum with only a fortuitous claim
on his property. Even within-this short range of cases, however,
it is not clear that a plaintiff with a meritorious claim would be
wise to seek the limited judgment thus available to him.
The most familiar hazard is the possibility of a limited appear-
ance by the defendant, which, if permitted, will necessitate multi-
ple litigation for full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. This is
a hazard only in cases where the plaintiff has attached property
insufficient to satisfy his claim. A substantial line of authority,53
which has recently been endorsed by Professor Currie, 4 has held
that a defendant in an in rem proceeding is not limited to the
ugly alternatives of defaulting or subjecting himself to the juris-
284 N.Y. 588, 29 N.E.2d 664 (1940). Accord, Vargas v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 25
N.J. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
11 Cf. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684,
697-98 (I95O).12 The Hoffman decision was heavily dependent on the "plain words" of §
1404(a) which were said to require the result. See 363 U.S. at 342-44.
"'McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940) ; Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co.,
285 Fed. 214 (6th Cir. 1922); Miller Bros. v. State, 201 Md. 535, 95
A.2d 286 (953), reversed on other grounds, 347 U.S. 340 (I954); Cheshire
Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, X12 N.E. 500 (1916). In Harnischfeger
Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Co., I79 La. 317, 154 So. io (i934), the court held
that the appearance of the Mississippi defendant in a quasi in rem proceed-
ing did not suffice to sustain a judgment in personam. But in a later action
in Mississippi for the deficiency, it was held that the defendant had had its day
in court on the defense asserted in the Louisiana action. Harnischfeger Sales Corp.
v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 189 Miss. 73, x91 So. 94 (1939), modification refused
on rehearing, I89 Miss. 73, 195 So. 322 (1940).
r4 Currie, supra note 8, at 379-8o.
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diction of the forum. He need not fish or cut bait, but may appear
under protest, asserting that he does not intend to be bound by
the judgment of the court except to the extent of the property
which the court has impounded by attachment or garnishment.
This device has the merit of affording defendants a shield against
plaintiffs with weak claims who hope to secure modest relief
through a quasi in rem judgment against property having value
small in proportion to the liability which the defendant would
hazard by a general appearance. On the other hand, this shield
is also useful for the unworthy defendant who may employ it to
compel the plaintiff to establish his meritorious claims twice be-
fore receiving full satisfaction. This is, of course, a result very
much at odds with the modern concept of res judicata. A number
of courts, including most of the federal courts recently consider-
ing the problem, have balanced the choice between mitigating the
duress and permitting multiple litigation on the merits of the same
claim, and have concluded that the limited appearance should be
refused, forcing the defendant to appear or default.5 5 Professor
Moore has endorsed this veiw.5 The proposed amendment to
rule 4 is silent on the issue of the limited appearance, but inas-
much as the whole thrust of the amendment is a reference to a
state law, it may be presumed that the Committee would con-
template its use in states in which it is permitted in local courts,
although federal courts have thus far dealt with the problem as a
matter of federal procedure.5 7 To the extent that the limited ap-
pearance would be available in some federal courts, it would pose
a threat to a plaintiff considering the use of quasi in rem proceed-
ing against property of inadequate value.
An alternative risk faces the plaintiff who is successful by rea-
son of the defendant's default in an action commenced by attach-
ment of assets inadequate to cover his claim. When the plaintiff
" United States v. Balonovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956)*, cert. denied, 352
U.S. 968 (1957); Anderson v. Benson, 117 F. Supp. 765 (D. Neb. i953); Campbell
v. Murdock, 90 F. Supp. 297 (N.D. Ohio ig5o); Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp.,
35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
56 2 FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 12.13 (2d ed. ig6i). See also Note, 25 IoWA L. REv.
329 (1940).
-7 See federal cases cited note 53 supra. Some significance seems to be attached
to FED. R. CIy. P. 12 which abolishes the specia appearance; clearly this rule is
irrelevant to the issue of the limited appearance. Professor Currie, supra note 8,
at 379-8o, suggests that the rules should be amended to provide for a limited
appearance regardless of the prevailing state rule. The issue of deference to state
law is a part of the larger question raised by the whole quasi in rem procedure;
this is discussed below.
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seeks to recover the balance of his claim in a second jurisdiction,
it may become the defendant's turn to plead res judicata. He may
then invoke as a defense the familiar injunction against splitting
the cause of action. All of the existing authority which is squarely
in point is against this defense." But modern cases abound which
evidence a willingness to require plaintiffs to settle for a single
remedy in situations where a judgment for full satisfaction might
have been had; the problem is not too distant from cases holding
that the plaintiff may not recover a judgment of ejectment and
later seek equitable relief,' 9 or seek contract damages in one ac-
tion and reformation in another,6" or seek personal injury dam-
ages in one action and property damages in another.6 Cases
holding against the defendant on the issue of res judicata have
reasoned woodenly that the absence of personal jurisdiction pre-
vents the merger of personal rights into a personal judgment. A
more functional approach might suggest that it would be desirable
to encourage economy of litigation by requiring the plaintiff to re-
solve his dispute whole in one lawsuit. Surely this is no more
stringent than the burden imposed on the defendant with refer-
ence to a compulsory counterclaim,62 and it is in accord with the
modern trend.63 And it would seem to be very fair in a jurisdic-
tion which does not recognize the limited appearance, for when
the two issues are placed in juxtaposition, it is not unreasonable
to urge that the plaintiff cannot have it both ways: if the defend-
"SStrand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266 (i93.5); Riverview State
Bank v. Dreyer, x88 Kan. 270, 362 P.2d 55 (1961) ; Oil Well Supply Co. v. Koen,
64 Ohio St., 422, 60 N.E. 603 (igoi).
" Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. iog, 62 N.E. 135 (i9oi); cf. McCaffrey v. Wiley,
io3 Cal. App. 2d 621, 230 P.2d 152 (Dist. Ct. App. ig5i). But cf. Adams v.
Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 104 N.E.2d 267 (1952). See generally Note, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 955 (1956).
60 Hennepin Paper Co. v. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co., 153 F.2d 822
(7th Cir. 1946)'; cf. Wischmann v. Raikes, x68 Neb. 728, 97 N.W.2d 55i (x959);
Massari v. Einsiedler, 6 N.J. 303, 78 A.2d 572 (i95i). But cf. Woodbury v. Porter,
158 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. X946).
61 Dearden v. Hey, 3o4 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (z939); Rush v. City of Maple
Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958).
Contra, Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 17o N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902).
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (b). The draftsman proposed also to amend this rule to
make it inapplicable to actions commenced quasi in rem. This is an explicit recog-
nition of the inconsistency of the quasi in rem judgment with the rules approach
to complete litigation. By pointing to this contrast, the writer does not wish
to be taken as giving full approval to the compulsory counterclaim rule, which
may well be overzealous in its push for total litigation.
3 Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAxv. L. REv. 818, 826 (1952).
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ant is entitled to only one day in court, the plaintiff should be en-
titled to only one also. The egalitarian morality of Hoffman
seems considerably more appropriate to this situation than to that
in which it was invoked.
It has been observed that both the limited appearance and the
alternative split-action rule are restraints only when the plain-
tiff is unable to find adequate assets in the jurisdiction to cover his
entire claim. But even if he finds sufficient assets, there may yet
be a chance that the fruits of the default victory will escape his
grasp, if he is subject to service of process in another state more
generally convenient to the parties. This possibility arises from
the prospects of a later action by the defaulting defendant against
the quasi in rem plaintiff for unjust enrichment. The theory of
such an action would be that the deliberate choice of a forum in-
convenient to the defendant for a claim of doubtful merit is so
unfairly coercive as to constitute duress vitiating the plaintiff's
rights to the proceeds of the former action. The authority for re-
covery on such a theory, as Professor Dawson has observed,64 is
remarkably sparse. The authority discovered is largely adverse
to recovery,65 and there are two fairly obvious contentions to be
made by the defendant in the restitution action. The first is that
he merely used legal processes in a manner permitted by law and
therefore cannot be condemned as a wrongdoer disentitled to the
benefits obtained. This is not, however, a complete answer, for it
is clear that the present plaintiff is entitled to restitution if he can
show an improper motive in the use of legal processes; a showing
that the former plaintiff knew that his claim was groundless would
be sufficient to show such an improper motive.60 Impropriety has
also been found, however, where a plaintiff with a claim of possi-
64 Duress Through Civil Litigation: I, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 571, 596 (i947). Pro-
fessor Dawson's appraisal of the possibilities of future developments in such cases
is that:
The limited use so far made in this area of the concept of duress can be in
large part explained by the general considerations of policy already suggested,
which quite rightly produce hesitation. In part, however, it appears to be due
to the survival of older ideas, which associate duress with blackmail or even
perhaps with mayhem, and which therefore inspire a search for some mis-
conduct by the creditor to which disapproval can attach. In the future more
decisions can be expected to support the broad proposition that where a suf-
ficient degree of pressure is shown to exist in fact and the resulting transaction
is sufficiently unjust, the means that are normally most legitimate can become
an instrument of extortion.
Id. at 598.
65 Ochivto v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 356 Pa. 382, 52 A.2d 228 (1947);
cf. Security Say. Bank v. Kellems, 321 Mo. X, 9 S.W.2d 967 (1928); Annot., I8
A.L.R. 1233 (1922).
66 RETATE=NT, RESTITUTION § 7I(1)(a) (1937).
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ble merit insisted on presenting his claim at a time 11 or place 6s
inconvenient to his alleged debtor. These cases would sustain
restitutionary recovery by a quasi in rem defendant who anti-
cipates the judgment by satisfying his creditor's claim. This sug-
gests defendant's second argument against restitution, which can
be made only if the judgment is entered and the assets held sub-
ject to the judgment are liquidated pursuant to it. This is the
familiar cry of res judicata - that the judgment has laid the
merits to rest. This is troublesome, however, for the quasi in rem
defendant has not yet had his day in court; he has had only an
opportunity to litigate, and that in an inconvenient forum. A
modern court, fully indoctrinated in the enthusiasm for the con-
venient forum and the abandonment of mechanical anachronisms,
could reasonably conclude that the quasi in rem judgment was
binding only on the property, not on the absent parties, and that
the time for litigation on the merits underlying the claim had not
yet passed. Surely, it has been a historic function of the unjust
enrichment remedy to relieve miseries caused by the wooden at-
tributes of the doctrine of res judicata.6 9
The hazard to the quasi in rem plaintiff of such a restitutionary
liability may perhaps be dismissed as remote. At the worst, the
plaintiff has succeeded in shifting the moving oar, if at the cost
of some attorneys' fees. It is probable that most defendants hav-
ing meritorious defenses would prefer venturing their case in the
forum selected by the plaintiff to risking a devious restitutionary
counterattack. Whether or not the hazards discussed are suffi-
cient to demolish the attraction to the plaintiff of quasi in rem
jurisdiction, a consideration of these problems serves at least to
illuminate the inadequacies of a half-baked quasi in rem judg-
ment. These inadequacies are the result of a historic lack of con-
viction about the fairness of requiring a defendant to respond in
a jurisdiction whose only claim on him is its chance capture of his
goods or debtor. There is no place for such a process in a pro-
cedural system which emphasizes the search for a forum which
can in fairness lay the whole dispute to rest.
61 Vyne v. Glenn, 41 Mich. 112, 1 N.W. 997 (1879); American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350 (1921). But cf. Myers v. Watson, 204
Iowa 635, 215 N.W. 634 (1927).
6 Kelley v. Osborn, 86 Mo. App. 239 (19oo); Collins v. Westbury, 2 S.C.
(Bay) 211 (1799) ; cf. Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co. of America,
7z NJ. Eq. 6i, 63 AUt. 546 (Ch. 19o6). But cf. Dickerman v. Lord & Smith, 21
Iowa 338 (i886).




Of course, the federal rulemakers cannot, on their own, shield
the defendant against quasi in rem jurisdiction so long as it is
available in state courts.70 It is this fact, alone perhaps, which in-
duced the Advisory Committee to make its proposal; for the one
argument advanced in favor of a change in rule 4 was that "there
appears to be no reason for denying plaintiffs means of commenc-
ing actions in federal courts which are generally available in the
state courts." "1 This plea for conformity between state and fed-
eral law is, of course, an expression of the deferential policy first
espoused in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.72 The Erie decision was
drastic and deliberate and had the quality of great drama: the
response was so enthusiastic and the applause so deafening that
the Court and its audience were lost in encores 73 and failed to
attend to the competing needs of Erie's sibling, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 74 When the cheering subsided, however, there
were critics to be heard,7 5 and the most recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court 76 are indicative of an awareness that excessive defer-
ence by the federal courts to local practice in all matters poten-
tially affecting the outcome of litigation is destructive of the rights
of federal litigants. Perhaps some of the encore cases were less
praiseworthy than the Erie decision itself.
One case which seems worthy of reconsideration is Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co.," which relates to the problem at hand. It
70 It would surely be regarded as a usurpation to amend § 1450 to provide for
a dismissal of removal cases commenced by attachment or garnishment. See note
ii supra.
71 CommiarTTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CON-
PERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELINARY DAr oF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
= RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 8 (1955).
72 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
73 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Woods v. In-
terstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (i949); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
"A poet-judge has described the Erie decision as a prenatal injury to the
rules. Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 222 (N.D. Iowa 1952) (Graven,
3.). See also Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play at the Federal
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950).
"
2 An early, strident voice was Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie,
34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949). More telling perhaps are Hart, The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 489, 509-13 (1954) and Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958).
71 Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, 360 U.S. 273 (1959) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
77 337 U.S. 535 (1949). Compare Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (I947).
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will be recalled that the Court there held that the federal courts in
Mississippi were bound to apply a statute of that state which
disabled nonqualifying foreign corporations doing business there
from maintaining suit in the courts of the state. The majority
opinion was dependent on the bromide that all matters classified
as outcome-determinative were to be adjudged by federal courts
in diversity cases on the basis of local law: since state law barred
recovery in state court, it was a bar in the federal court in a di-
versity case. This is hard law; Justice Jackson observed in dis-
sent:
The state statute as now interpreted by this Court is a harsh,
capricious and vindictive measure. It either refuses to entertain
a cause of action, not impaired by state law, or it holds it invalid
with unknown effects on amounts already collected. In either case
the amount of this punishment bears no relation to the amount
of wrong done the State in failure to qualify and pay its taxes. The
penalty thus suffered does not go to the State, which sustained the
injury, but results in unjust enrichment of the debtor, who has
suffered no injury from the creditor's default in qualification.7"
It must be conceded to the majority that there is some unseemli-
ness in the employment of federal jurisdiction to frustrate Missis-
sippi's regulation of foreign corporations if, as the majority be-
lieved, that was what Mississippi sought to do. But the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement7 assures that the frustration would
not be complete: the unqualified foreign corporation would still
have no relief for small claims. And it is, after all, the mission
of the diversity jurisdiction to protect nonresident litigants from
just such harshness. 80 State rules which are fashioned especially
for nonresidents are too likely to bear the imprint of hometown
prejudices to be entitled to willy-nilly application in courts which
should serve as bulwarks against such prejudices. The omnibus
application of the Erie rule suggested by the majority opinion
would not only deny the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in diversity cases, it would rob the diversity jurisdiction of
purpose and meaning. If this is the intent, integrity would re-
quire abolition.
78 337 U.S. at 539-40.
79 Now $io,ooo in diversity and federal-question cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332
(1958).
8 0 T3E FEDERALIST No. So (Hamilton); Hart, supra note 75; Hill, supra note
7g; Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEmP.
PROB. 3, 22-28 (,948); see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 4 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928).
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The problem of quasi in rem proceedings in diversity cases calls
even more forcefully for the application of a federal policy. This
is so, first, because there is no sound reason for invoking the Erie
tradition. The most frequently articulated purpose in applying
state law in diversity cases is the avoidance of forum-shopping,
but it is clear that forum-shopping is not encouraged by the
present system of closing the federal forum to quasi in rem ac-
tions and thereby limiting the plaintiff's choice to the state court.
And it is also true that there is little substance to the local policy
embodied in the continued use of quasi in rem procedure in local
courts. In this respect, the Interstate Realty case is distinguish-
able. There is also an essential difference to be seen between
providing a federal forum to a nonresident plaintiff who is barred
by state law, and denying a federal forum to a resident plaintiff
who is protected under state law, for in the one case the local
policy is frustrated and in the other it is not. The recent decision
of the Second Circuit in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc." is
here worthy of notice. The court there offered as one ground for its
decision the conclusion that amenability to service of process
under rule 4(d) 82 is to be determined by federal law, thus re-
jecting the contention of the defendant that sound application of
the Erie doctrine required application of an especially restric-
tive New York concept of "doing business." This holding is con-
sistent with the position taken above, but it is not consistent with
the practice in other circuits 85 and was the subject of a vigorous
dissent by Judge Friendly, 4 who urged that there is no articu-
lated federal policy as to the amenability of foreign corporations
to service of process and no sufficient reason exists for not giving
effect to New York policy. Both opinions are subject to criticism
for failure to perceive the difference between a federal policy
which is more permissive than the state policy with respect to the
demands which may be made on the nonresident defendant and
81 282 F.2d 5o (2d Cir. 1960).
s2 Alternatively, the court held that Randolph Mills was "doing business" in
New York by any standard.
13 Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Albritton
v. General Factors Corp. 2ox F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Canvas Fabricators, Inc.
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952); Steinway v.
Majestic Amusement Co., 79 F.2d 68i (ioth Cir. 1949). But see Riverbank
Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 350 U.S. 1003 (1956), reversing per
curain, 220 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1955), on remand, 236 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1956).
See generally, Note, 67 YA= L.J. 1094 (3958).
S4 282 F.2d at S16.
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one that is less permissive. Judge Friendly is probably wrong in
relying on the absence of a federal policy on the issue before the
court: if there is none, there should be, and there is no time like
the present for beginning to work it out. But he is probably right
in result for the reason that it is not consistent with any purpose
of the federal diversity jurisdiction for the federal courts to be
more outreaching than the state courts. If, as Judge Friendly
suggests it might, New York should choose to send its plaintiffs
to North Carolina to sue corporations like Randolph Mills, so
that North Carolina corporations will thereby be encouraged to
deal with New Yorkers, there is no federal interest which can
justify the frustration of that policy by opening a federal forum
in New York to the New York plaintiffs.85 This is to be more
Roman than the Pope. Where, on the other hand, New York or
another state is overreaching, and seeking to expose to liability
nonresident defendants who are not adequately connected with
the forum, it would be highly proper for the federal courts to re-
fuse to conform, to force the plaintiff to use the state courts for
such skulduggery, and to provide only the defendant with the
choice of a federal forum. 6 Even more proper is the preservation
of this historic form of protest against the use of quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the alternative holding in the Jaftex case is
sound, it may yet be favored as a welcome signpost of the new
awareness of the federal courts to their responsibility for high
standards of justice in diversity cases, a responsibility too long
forgotten. What Professor Currie has condemned as a historic
stupidity8 7 has become a modern wisdom, for the proposed
amendment to rule 4 is regrettably out of step, not only with the
modern quest for a fair choice of forum but also with the long-
awaited and now emerging concept of the proper role of the
federal diversity jurisdiction.
8 5 Per contra where the local policy excludes actions between nonresidents as
an economy in the operation of the state courts. Willis v. Well Pump Co., 222
F.2d 261 (2d Cir. i95S).
" The advisors could well consider the amendment of rule 4(d) to assure that
federal courts will exercise their responsibility in shaping the emerging principles of
forum selection. When the implications of this suggestion are considered, however,
it is obvious that substantive policy factors are entitled to more weight in the
decision than the rulemaking process is equipped to give them. Perhaps the
advisors should address themselves to Congress. Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 82. But cf.
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (X946).
"
7Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 337
(196i).
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